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Notes
The Supreme Court's Decision in Cheek:
Does It Encourage Willful Tax Evasion?
Cheek v. United States'
I. INTRODUCTION

The general rule in criminal proceedings is that ignorance of the law or
a misunderstanding of the applicability of the law is no excuse. This rule
is based on a common law presumption that the law is "definite and
knowable" by everyone.3 Based on the magnitude and complexity of modern
tax law, however, special treatment has been accorded to criminal tax
offenders, including a bona fide ignorance of the law defense.'
Yet,
disagreement arises as to whether the ignorance or misunderstanding defense
should be scrutinized under a subjective or objective standard.5 With the
exception of the United States Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, the circuits
have held that a subjective standard should be applied to defendants' asserted
belief that they were ignorant of, or misunderstood, the law.6 In Cheek v.
United States, the United States Supreme Court, by a six to two vote, upheld
this majority position.7
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Petitioner John L. Cheek has been employed by American Airlines as a
pilot since 1973.8 Cheek properly filed his income tax returns from 1969 to
1979. 9 With the exception of a frivolous return filed in 1982, he did not file
tax returns from 1980 to 1986.10 During this period, Cheek initiated several

1. 111 S. Ct. 604 (1991).
2.
3.
4.
5.

See
See
See
See

infra notes 132-33 and accompanying text.
infra note 57 and accompanying text.
infra notes 67 & 136 and accompanying text.
infra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.

6. Id.
7. See infra note 146 and accompanying text.
8. United States v. Cheek, 882 F.2d 1263, 1265 (7th Cir. 1989) [hereinafter Cheek
1], cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 1108 (1990), vacated, 111 S. Ct. 604 (1991).
9. Cheek v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 604, 606 (1991) [hereinafter Cheek 11].
10. Cheek I, 882 F.2d at 1265. Additionally, from January, 1980, to January,
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civil suits against American Airlines and the Internal Revenue Service (the
"Service")." The suit against American alleged wrongful withholding of
taxes from his wages.' 2 In the suits against the Service, Cheek asserted
various reasons for not being required to pay any income tax, most of which
were rejected or discharged for being frivolous. As a result of his failure
to file tax returns, Cheek was indicted for ten violations of federal income tax
law in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. 4
He was charged with three counts of willfully attempting to evade income tax
for the years 1980, 1981, and 1983, in violation of 26 U.S.C. section 7201.15
In addition, Cheek was charged with six counts of willfully failing to file a

federal income tax return for the years 1980, 1981, and 1983 through 1986,
in violation of 26 U.S.C. section 7203.16

1981, Cheek filed frivolous W-4 forms claiming a rising number of withholding
allowances. These allowances eventually reached as many as sixty. He subsequently
claimed a complete exemption from taxation on his W-4 forms. Id.
11. 1d. at 1265.
12. Id. Cheek, along with another American Airlines employee, filed this suit in
March, 1982. Cheek 11, 111 S. Ct. at 607.
13. Cheek II, 111 S. Ct. at 607 n.3. Cheek's suit against the Service in the Tax
Court in April, 1982, asserted that he was not a taxable person under the Internal
Revenue Code, that his wages were not income, and several other analogous claims.
Along with four others, Cheek filed a suit against the United States and the
Commissioner of the Service in the federal district court stating that withholding taxes
from their wages violated the sixteenth amendment. In 1985, Cheek filed claims with
the Service seeking refunds for taxes withheld from his earnings in 1983 and 1984.
When these claims were disallowed, he brought suit in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois alleging that withholding was "an unconstitutional
taking of his property" and again that his wages were not income. Dismissing the case
as frivolous, the district court assessed $1,500 in attorney fees and costs and a
sanction, under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in the amount of
$10,000. This sanction was subsequently reduced on appeal to $5,000 by the United
States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit. Cheek II, 111 S. Ct. at 607 n.3. See also
Cheek v. Doe, 828 F.2d 395 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 955 (1987).
14. Cheek II, 111 S. Ct. at 606.
15. Id. at 606-07. The statute reads:
§ 7201. Attempt to evade or defeat tax.
Any person who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat
any tax imposed by this title or the payment thereof shall, in addition to
other penalties provided by law, be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction
thereof, shall be fined not more than $100,000 ($500,000 in the case of a

corporation), or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both, together with
the costs of prosecution.

I.R.C. § 7201 (1988).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss4/7
16. Cheek 11, 111 S. Ct. at 606. The statute reads:
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Cheek represented himself at trial and, during the course of his testimony,
admitted that he did not file tax returns during the years in dispute.' 7 He
testified that in early 1978 he began attending seminars sponsored by an
association that promoted among other things, the unconstitutionality of the
federal tax system.' 8 As his defense, Cheek claimed that, in addition to his
own research, the indoctrination he received from this group firmly established
his belief that the tax laws were unconstitutionally ,enforced, thus making his
actions from 1980 to 1986 lawful.' 9 Based on this belief, Cheek argued that

he could not have acted with the willfulness required for the various offenses
for which he was accused. 20
While administering its instructions, the district court explained to the
jury that "willfulness" required the government to prove "the voluntary and
intentional violation of a known legal duty." 21 The court forewarned that
merely showing mistake, ignorance, or negligence were not sufficient to prove
willfulness.22 "An objectively reasonable good-faith misunderstanding of the
law," advised the court, "would negate willfulness but mere disagreement with
the law would not."' In commenting on Cheek's beliefs about the income
tax system, the court instructed the jury that if it found that Cheek "honestly
and reasonably believed that he was not required to pay income taxes or to

§ 7203. Willful failure to file return, supply information or pay tax.
Any person required under this title to pay any estimated tax or tax,
or required by this title or by regulations made under authority thereof to
make a return, keep any records, or supply any information, who willfully
fails to pay such estimated tax or tax, make such return, keep such records,
or supply such information, at the time or times required by law or
regulations, shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be guilty
of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more
than $25,000 ($100,000 in the case of a corporation), or imprisoned not

more than 1 year, or both, together with the costs of prosecution. ...
I.R.C. § 7203 (West Supp. 1991).
17. Cheek II, 111 S. Ct. at 607.
18. Included as speakers at those meetings were attorneys who allegedly gave
professional opinions about the "invalidity of the federal income tax laws." Id. Cheek
introduced into evidence a letter from a lawyer asserting that the sixteenth amendment
did not authorize a tax on wages and salaries but only on gain or profit. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.

22. Id. at 607-08.
23. Id. at 608.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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file tax returns," the jury should return with a verdict of not guilty. 24 After
deliberating for several hours, the jury sent out a note to the judge stating:'
We have a basic disagreement between some of us as to if Mr. Cheek

honestly and reasonably believed that he was not required to pay income
taxes ... Page 32 [the relevant jury instruction] discusses good faith

misunderstanding and disagreement. Is there any clarification you can give
us on this point?26
In response, the district judge issued a supplemental instruction stating that an
individual's opinion that the tax laws are violative of his constitutional rights
is not a good faith misunderstanding of the law.27 In addition, the instruction
stipulated that a personal disagreement with the tax collection system and
policies of the government does not establish a good faith misunderstanding
of the law.2s Despite the seemingly dispositive nature of this instruction, the
jury sent out another note at the end of the first day reaffirming its inability
to reach a verdict because of disagreement over whether the petitioner
honestly and reasonably believed that he was not required to pay income
tax. 29 Upon resuming their deliberations, the jury was given an additional
instruction by the judge which stated:
"[A]n honest but unreasonable belief is not a defense and does not negate
willfulness," and that "[a]dvice or research resulting in the conclusion that
wages of a privately employed person are not income or that the tax laws
are unconstitutional is not objectively reasonable and cannot30serve as the
basis for a good faith misunderstanding of the law defense."
After two-and-a-half more hours of deliberation, the jury returned with a
verdict of guilty on all counts.'

24. Id.

25. This was the second note sent out to the judge. The first note had requested
a transcript of Cheek's testimony in which he discussed his beliefs. Cheek 1, 882 F.2d
at 1266.
26. Cheek II, 111 S. Ct. at 608.
"27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. (citation omitted).
31. Id. The jury included several notes with the verdict. One note, signed by all
12 jurors, stated that they found the defendant guilty on all counts but that some jurors
wished to express their personal opinions, which were "not meant to affect in any way
their verdict of guilty." Id. The notes were "a complaint against the narrow and hard
expression under the constraints of the law." Cheek I, 882 F.2d at 1266-67. At least
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss4/7
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On appeal, Cheek argued that the district court erred by instructing the
jury that only "an objectively reasonable misunderstanding of the law negates
the statutory willfulness requirement. " 32 The Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals rejected his argument and affirmed the convictions.33 The Seventh
Circuit relied on prior cases that had clearly indicated that a good faith

misunderstanding of the law must be objectively reasonable to negate the
willfulness requirement'
Referring to a prior decision, the court restated its
holding that certain particular beliefs, including beliefs that tax laws are

unconstitutional and that wages are not income, would never be objectively
reasonable. 35
On further appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed the Seventh
Circuit and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its
decision. 36 The Supreme Court held that a defendant's beliefs about the
validity or unconstitutionality of tax statutes are irrelevant to the issue of
willfulness and therefore any instruction to disregard them would be proper.37
A defendant's good faith misunderstanding of the law or good faith belief that

two of the notes expressed opinions of individual jurors that the petitioner "sincerely
believed in his cause even though his beliefs might have been unreasonable." Cheek
11, 111 S. Ct. at 608 n.6.
32. Cheek I, 111 S. Ct. at 608.
33. Id. See Cheek 1,882 F.2d at 1263.
34. Cheek II, 111 S. Ct. at 608-09. See, e.g., United States v. Buckner, 830 F.2d
102 (7th Cir. 1987).
35. Cheek 1I, 111 S. Ct. at 609. The Seventh Circuit, in its opinion, noted that:
[T]he following beliefs, which are stock arguments of the tax protester
movement, have not been, nor ever will b6, considered "objectively
reasonable" in this circuit:
(1) the belief that the sixteenth amendment to the constitution was
improperly ratified and therefore never came into being;
(2) the belief that the sixteenth amendment is unconstitutional generally;
(3) the belief that the income tax violates the takings clause of the fifth
amendment;
(4) the belief that the tax laws are unconstitutional;
(5) the belief that wages are not income and therefore are not subject to

federal income tax laws;
(6) the belief that filing a tax return violates the privilege against selfincrimination; and
(7) the belief that Federal Reserve Notes do not constitute cash or income.
Cheek 1,882 F.2d at 1268-69 n.2.
36. Cheek 17, 111 S.Ct. at 613.
37. Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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he is not violating the law will negate willfulness, however, regardless of
whether or not it is objectively reasonable.3"
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The fundamental basis of the federal tax system is voluntary taxpayer
compliance with tax laws. Voluntary compliance implies a fictitious
environment, free from the watchful and pervading view of a fierce tax
collector." It creates an illusion of every citizen faithfully filing tax returns
and honestly reporting taxable income as part of a duty to the community.
Although this could be the scenario for a small segment of the taxpaying
society, voluntary compliance is more realistically achieved by a fear of the
fierce tax collector who scrutinizes a taxpayer's every move, ready to grab any
transgressor." Voluntary compliance is a primary objective of the Internal
Revenue Service, which seeks to achieve such compliance by increasing
simplicity and providing guidance to taxpayers.4 1 If voluntary compliance
is so essential to revenue collection, then ignorance of those laws that require
the payment of taxes should not be a defense to crimes involving the tax
laws.42 But, in fact, ignorance of the law is a defense to federal tax crimes
This is due, in part, to the
as they are currently written and interpreted.
word "willfully," which is contained in the criminal penalty sections of the
Internal Revenue Code.44 From this requirement of willfulness emerges the
ignorance of the law defense. As the instant decision postulates, taxpayers
cannot "willfully" evade income tax if they have an honest and good faith
belief that they are not required by law to file tax returns.4 5 This good faith
defense to the willfulness requirement raises the primary issue of whether
taxpayers' good faith beliefs must be reasonable.46 In addition to providing
a basis for the ignorance of the law defense, the meaning of the term
"willfully" has long plagued those courts attempting to 'apply the standard to
criminal sanctions in federal tax cases.

38.
39.
L. REV.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 605.
Yochum, Ignoranceof theLaw Is No Excuse Except for Tax Crimes, 27 DUQ.
221, 223 (1989).
Id.

Id.
Id.
Id.
I.R.C. § 7201 (1988); I.R.C. § 7203 (West Supp. 1991). See supra notes 15-

16 for the text of these statutes.
45. Cheek 1, 882 F.2d at 1270.
46. Cheek II, 111 S. Ct. at 611.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss4/7
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A. Historical CriminalLaw Analysis
Ignorance or mistake of law is the area of substantive criminal law that

has been surrounded by the most confusion.4 7 The frequently erroneous
assumption is that ignorance or mistake of law is not a defense, but that a
mistake of fact is a defense.' In fact, ignorance of the law is a defense to
a criminal charge under certain circumstances. This confusion is further
compounded by the fact that "ignorance of the law" really encompasses two
situations, each of which calls for different analyses and produces different
results. The first situation occurs where defendants lack the mental state49
required for the commission of the crime and therefore have a valid defense 5 The second situation occurs where defendants have the required
mental state but claim they were unaware that such conduct was prohibited by
the criminal law. This ordinarily is not recognized as a defense.5 ' For
example, defendants do not commit the crime of larceny if, because of
mistaken understanding of the property laws, they believed that the property
belonged to them 2 The crime would be committed, however, if the
defendant believed it was lawful to take certain property belonging to others
because it was a community custom. 53 The requisite mental state needed for
the crime of larceny-intent to steal or take property belonging to another-is
not present in the first example because defendants believed that the property
belonged to them and therefore could not have intended to take another
person's property. The intent to steal, however, is present in the second
example because they did intend to take property belonging to someone else.
As one commentator has noted, "[i]t is not the intent to violate the law but the
intentional doing of the act which is a violation of the law." 54 As illustrated
by these examples, the basic rule is that "ignorance or mistake of the law is
47. W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, CRIMINAL LAw § 5.1(a) (2d ed. 1986).
48. Id.

49. Generally, crimes have two components: the actus reus and the mens rea.
The actus reus is a voluntary act or an omission by a defendant. J. DRESSLER,
UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAw § 9.01[A] (1987). The "mental state provided in the
definition of an offense" is commonly referred to as mens rea. For example, murder
is defined by a state as "the intentional killing of a human being by another human
being." The actus reus of the offense is "the killing of a human being by another
human being." The mens rea of the offense is "intentional" and therefore the
defendant is not guilty of the crime unless he committed the actus reus intentionally.
Id. § 10.02[c].

50.
51.
52.
53.

W. LAFAvE & A. Sco-r, supra note 47, § 5.1(d).

Id.
Id.
Id.

21 S.E. 689Repository,
(1895)).
54. Id.
Stateofv.Missouri
Downs, School
116 N.C.
Published
by (citing
University
of 1064,
Law Scholarship
1991
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a defense when it negatives the existence of a mental state essential to the
crime charged." 55 Therefore, pure ignorance of the law (defendants are
unaware of the statute prohibiting their conduct) and mistake of the law
(defendants have mistakenly concluded that the relevant statute does not apply
to their conduct) are not normally defenses to a criminal charge because they
do not negate the requisite mental state accompanying the act.56
The nonrecognition of this defense is rooted in an early theory that the
law is "definite and knowable" and therefore there is a presumption that
everyone knows the law.57 The benefits and detriments of such a presumption have been continually debated through the years. In a historical context,
it was once possible for the average citizen to actually know the law when it
was simple and limited in scope. But this is unrealistic with today's complex
criminal laws. If all defendants were allowed to use an ignorance of the
law defense, then finders of fact would be consistently confronted with an
issue they could not readily resolve.59 It is argued that this defense, if
allowed, would create a shield for the guilty because the defendants' ignorance
claims would be difficult to repudiate.6 Additionally, if defendants were
actually ignorant of the law, an extensive analysis would be necessary to
determine whether or not the defendants were at fault in not knowing the
law. 61 The balancing of defendants' and society's interests cuts against
recognizing an ignorance of the law defense. Although the result may be
harsh on defendants who were reasonably ignorant of the law, the interest of
the general public far outweighs that of the individual. 62 By convicting
defendants of the crimes for which they claim an ignorance defense, the
existence of these laws is brought home to the public and helps to establish
them in the community.63

55. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 47, § 5.1(a). In this regard, the Model
Penal Code states:
(1) Ignorance or mistake as to a matter of fact or law is a defense if:
(a) the ignorance or mistake negatives the purpose, knowledge, belief,
recklessness or negligence required to establish a material element of the
offense; or
(b) the law provides that the state of mind established by such
ignorance or mistake constitutes a defense.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(1) (1991).

56. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 47, § 5.1(d).
57. Id. (citing Weeks v. State, 24 Ala. App. 198, 132 So. 870 (1931)).
58. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 47, § 5.1(d).
59. Id.
60. Id. (citing People v. O'Brien, 96 Cal. 171, 31 P. 45 (1892)).
61. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 47, § 5.1(d).
62. Id.
63. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss4/7
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Despite the balancing of the public interest, a "good faith" ignorance of
the law is a recognized defense in the area of tax crimes.' The Supreme
Court clearly supports this good faith defense, as evidenced by the landmark
case of United States v. Murdocks where it was recognized that:
Congress did not intend that a person, by reason of a bona fide misunderstanding as to his liability for the tax, as to his duty to make a return, or as
to the adequacy of the records he maintained, should become a criminal by
his mere failure to measure up to the prescribed standard of conduct.6
The Murdock decision and its interpretation of the statutory term "willfully"
created an exception to the traditional rule and began special treatment for
criminal tax offenses because of the complexity of tax laws. 67
B. FederalTax Crimes and the "Willfilness" Requirement
1. Statutory Overview
The belief that the stigma of a criminal conviction and imprisonment will
help preserve a tax system based on voluntary compliance is fundamental to
the criminal tax enforcement program.' The main criminal sanction utilized

to attain that conviction is section 7201, which provides that any person "who
willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax" is guilty of a
felony and upon conviction can be subject to fines of up to $100,000 and
imprisonment of up to five years.69 The Supreme Court, in Spies v. United
States,70 labeled this section as "the capstone of a system of sanctions" that
were intended to "induce prompt and forthright fulfillment of every duty under
the income tax law and to provide a penalty suitable to every degree of
delinquency.'1 In Sansone v. United States, 72 the Supreme Court delineated the elements of section 7201 as willfulness, a tax deficiency, and an

64. See United States v. Flitcraft, 803 F.2d 184, 186-87 (5th Cir. 1986), reh'g
denied, 863 F.2d 342 (5th Cir.), cert denied,490 U.S. 1080 (1989) (discusses several
cases which address this "good faith" defense).
65. 290 U.S. 389 (1933).
66. Id. at 396.
67. Cheek 1H, 111 S.Ct. at 609.
68. Davis, Recent Developments in Criminal Tax Matters, 47

INST. ON FED.

TAX'N § 46.01[1] (1989).
69. I.R.C. § 7201 (1990). See supra note 15 for the full text of this statute.
70. 317 U.S. 492 (1943).
71. Id. at 497.
72. 380 U.S. 343 (1965).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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affirmative act that constitutes an evasion or an attempted evasion of the
73

tax.

Another criminal sanction can be imposed under section 7203, which
criminalizes the willful failure to pay a tax or file a tax return.7 4 Violation
of this section is a misdemeanor with fines of up to $25,000 and a maximum
of one year of imprisonment.75 A section 7203 misdemeanor requires proof
that (1) a legal duty to file a tax return existed; (2) there was a failure to do
so; and (3) the defendant acted willfully.7 6 The purpose of section 7203 is
to encompass omissions that would not be sufficient for a conviction under
section 7201.' A failure to file without more, such as an affirmative act,
will not sustain a section 7201 conviction.78
The most widely used criminal sanction is 26 U.S.C. section 7206, which
makes it a crime to "[w]illfully [make] and [subscribe] any return.., or other
document which contains or is verified by a written declaration that it is under
penalties of perjury and he does not believe to be true and correct as to every
material matter. 0 9 Violations of section 7206 are felonies, and upon
conviction can result in fines of up to $100,000 and imprisonment of up to
three years.80
The pivotal element of each of these criminal sanctions is willfulness.81
Congress included a "willfulness" element in the criminal tax statutes to
implement a "pervasive intent ... to construct penalties that separate the
purposeful tax violator from the well-meaning, but easily confused, mass of
taxpayers. 8 2 In its attempt to separate these two types of taxpayers,
however, Congress has succeeded in adding confusion to court decisions
attempting to interpret the "willfulness" element.

73. Id. at 351.
74. I.R.C. § 7203 (West Supp. 1991). See supra note 16 for the full text of this
statute.
75. Id.
76. United States v. Gorman, 393 F.2d 209,213 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
832 (1968).
77. Peterson, Tax fraud: What steps the attorney can take to defend his client
against it, 5 TAXATION FOR LAWYERS 244, 244 (1977).
78. Spies, 317 U.S. at 499.
79. Id. See I.R.C. § 7206 (1988).
80. I.R.C. § 7206(1) (1988).
81. Peterson, supra note 77, at 244.
82. Note, CriminalLiabilityfor Willful Evasion of an Uncertain Tax, 81 CoLUM.
L. REv. 1348, 1354 (1981) (quoting Spies, 317 U.S. at 497-98).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss4/7
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2. The "Willfulness" Requirement
The first case to construe this distinguishing element was United States
In Murdock, the Supreme Court held that a taxpayer in a
criminal prosecution under the predecessor to 26 U.S.C. section 7205' was
entitled to a jury instruction stating that the jury, in ascertaining willfulness,
could consider whether a refusal to comply was "in good faith and based upon
his actual belief."85 The Court noted that the word "willfully" often signifies
an act that is "intentional, or knowing, or voluntary, as distinguished from
accidental. But, when used in a criminal statute, it generally means an act
done with a bad purpose... , "8 or with "an evil motive ....
,
In Spies v. United States, the Supreme Court reviewed a tax evasion
conviction under the predecessor to section 7201. The defendant claimed
psychological disturbance as a defense for his failure to file a return and pay
tax.' The Court rejected the trial court's interpretation of the term "willfully" as "voluntarily" because it failed to give effect to an inferred congressional
intent that was evidenced by classifying certain crimes as felonies and others
as misdemeanors.8 9 The Court held that the difference between the two
offenses-a willful failure to pay tax when due under section 7203 and a
willful attempt to evade or defeat taxes under section 7201-was that the
latter felony involves "some willful commission in addition to the willful
omissions that make up the list of misdemeanors." 90 In reference to what
affirmative action would constitute a willful attempt, the Court stated that an
inference could be made from the following conduct:
v. Murdock.8

keeping a double set of books, making false entries or alterations, or false
invoices or documents, destruction of books or records, concealment of
assets or covering up sources of income, handling of one's affairs to avoid
making the records usual in transactions of the kind, and any conduct, the
likely effect of which would be to mislead or to conceal.91

83. 290 U.S. 389, 393 (1933).
84. I.R.C. § 7205 (West Supp. 1991) (addresses the fraudulent withholding

exemption certificate or failure to supply information).
85. Yochum, supra note 39, at 224 (quoting United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S.
389, 393 (1933)).
86. Murdock, 290 U.S. at 394.
87. Id. at 395.

88. Spies, 317 U.S. at 493.
89. Id. at 497.
90. Id. at 499.
91. Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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Spies, however, left some confusion as to whether the word "willfully" was
to be applied uniformly, or in varying degrees depending on the tax felonies
and misdemeanors set forth in sections 7201-7207.'
In United States v. Bishop,93 the Supreme Court attempted to clarify the
application of the term "willfully." The Court held that Congress distinguished the misdemeanor and felony statutes in ways that did not turn on the
meaning of the word "willfully".94 The Court stated that the distinction was
founded on "the additional misconduct which is essential to the violation of
and not in the quality of willfulness which characterizes
the felony statute..,
5
the wrongdoing.0
The Supreme Court abandoned the evil motive characterization of
"willfully" in United States v. Pomponio.96 The Court held that the term
"willful" as used in section 7206, which makes it a felony to willfully file a
false income tax return, simply meant a "voluntary, intentional violation of a
known legal duty. 97 Additionally, there was no requirement to find an evil
motive beyond a specific inlent to violate the law. 98
3. The Good-Faith Defense: Subjective Versus Objective Standard
Despite the Court's clarification in Pomponio, differences among the
circuits arose over the application of the "known legal duty" or knowledge
requirement. Particularly, the courts differed over whether a good faith
ignorance of the law had to be objectively reasonable to be a defense.99 In
United States v. Aitken,"° the First Circuit Court of Appeals contemplated
whether willfulness meant a subjective intent to disobey the law or "merely
the absence of what a jury would consider an objectively reasonable ground
for failure to comply."'0 1 The First Circuit rejected the trial court's jury
instruction that a mistaken belief must be reasonably held and ruled that
willfulness must be evaluated subjectively. 0 2 As one commentator poignantly stated, the outrageousness of the belief that an exchange of time for

92.
93.
94.
95.

See United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346, 356, 360 n.8 (1973).
412 U.S. 346 (1973).
Id. at 358.
Id. at 358-59 (quoting United States v. Vitiello, 363 F.2d 240, 243 (3d Cir.

1966)).
96. 429 U.S. 10 (1976).
97. Id. at 12.
98. Id.
99. Yochum, supra note 39, at 229.
100. 755 F.2d 188 (1st Cir. 1985).
101. Id. at 189.
102. Id. at 192.
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money was not income "should certainly influence the jury's determination as
to whether the belief is actually held [by the taxpayer], but if held, the
taxpayer is innocent." 03
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a taxpayer's
conviction in United States v. Burton... because the trial court instructed the
jury that the defendant's belief that wages were not income was no defense. 10 5 The Fifth Circuit sympathized with trial judges who believed that
many defendants were able to escape justice by using shrewd arguments that
confused juries about the actual state of the law.( 6 The court hoped,
however, that the outrageousness of the defendant's alleged belief would
influence the jury when considering the defendant's credibility.0 7
Disregarding the majority of other circuits that have held that a subjective
standard is necessary in evaluating willfulness,1'8 the Seventh Circuit
adopted an "objectively reasonable" standard in United States v. Moore.'09
In Moore, a tax protestor who filed a return with only his name, address, and
social security number, was charged with failure to file.110 The protestor
claimed that Federal Reserve Notes were not legal tender or money and
therefore were not taxable as income."' The trial court jury instructions
defined willfully as a violation of a known legal duty and then stated that "the
question is, did he reasonably believe" the returns were adequate or properly
filed." 2 The Seventh Circuit upheld the instruction, although deeming it
unnecessary, and stated that "the mistake of law defense
is extremely limited
3
and the mistake must be objectively reasonable."1

103. Yochum, supra note 39, at 228.
104. 737 F.2d 439 (5th Cir. 1984).
105. Id. at 441.
106. Id. at 442-43.

107. Id. at 443.
108. See United States v. Whiteside, 810 F.2d 1306, 1310-11 (5th Cir. 1987);
United States v. Aitken, 755 F.2d 188, 192-93 (1st Cir. 1985); United States v.
Phillips, 775 F.2d 262, 263-64 (10th Cir. 1985); United States v. Burton, 737 F.2d
439, 441-42 (5th Cir. 1984); United States v. Kraeger, 711 F.2d 6, 7 (2d Cir. 1983);
United States v. Ingredient Technology Corp., 698 F.2d 88, 97 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
462 U.S. 1131 (1983); Cooley v. United States, 501 F.2d 1249, 1253 (9th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied,419 U.S. 1123 (1975); Mann v. United States, 319 F.2d 404, 409-10 (5th

Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 986 (1964); Yarborough v. United States, 230 F.2d
56, 61 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 969 (1956); Battjes v. United States, 172 F.2d
1, 4 (6th Cir. 1949).
109. 627 F.2d 830 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 619 (1981).
110. Id. at 831.
111. Id. at 833.
112. Id.
113. Id.
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In United States v. Phillips,"4 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
explicitly rejected the Moore decision by holding that a subjective rather than
an objective standard should be applied in assessing a defendant's claimed

belief that he was not required under the law to file a return because wages

were not income." 5 Despite Phillips' criticism of Moore, the Seventh
Circuit held steadfast to its objective standard in its subsequent decision of
United States v. Foster."6 The court held that in proving willfulness the
government was only required to show that the defendant intentionally
violated a known legal duty, without demonstrating any bad purpose on his
part, and that7 any mistake on the defendant's part must be "objectively
reasonable.""
Discussions about the Seventh Circuit's position that an objective
standard is necessary to establish lack of willfulness have concluded that the
court was simply wrong." 8 As defined by the Supreme Court, these
9
criminal tax offenses require an element of knowledge of the legal duty."
Whether defendants' beliefs -of the legality of their actions are correct or
incorrect, or reasonable or unreasonable, are irrelevant to determining
willfulness.' 20 The only issue is whether or not those beliefs were in fact
held by the defendants.' 2 ' An explicit disagreement with the law; however,
Taxpayers
is not a defense, nor is a mistake or ignorance of the law.
cannot use a belief that taxes are being collected from them for an improper
purpose as a defense to tax evasion or failure to file a return."12
In United States v. House,2 4 the United States District Court for the
Western District of Michigan held that a good faith belief that tax laws are
unconstitutional does not negate the element of willfulness." The court

114. 775 F.2d 262 (10th Cir. 1985).
115. Id. at 264.
116. 789 F.2d 457 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 883 (1986); see also Cheek
1, 882 F.2d at 1267; United States v. Buckner, 830 F.2d 102, 103 (7th Cir. 1987).

117. United States v. Foster, 789 F.2d 457, 461 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
883 (1986).
118. Yochum, supra note 39, at 230.
119. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
120. See Note, supra note 82, at 1356.
121. See id.
122. See Yochum, supra note 39, at 230.
123. Id.
124. 617 F. Supp. 232 (W.D. Mich. 1985), affd by order, 787 F.2d 593 (6th Cir.
1986).
125. Id. at 234. The court additionally held that a good faith misunderstanding
of the law's requirement negates the element of willfulness. Id. at 234. See also
United States v. Harrold, 796 F.2d 1275 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1037
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explained that it was "immediately apparent that the premise of these decisions
[cases from other circuits with similar holdings] is that in each case the
defendant knew of the tax law and was not uncertain about the duty Congress
meant to impose.""
The court, in agreement with the government, recognized that there was a "difference between willful defiance of a statute and
ignorance of a statute's existence or meaning."' 27 Nonrecognition of the
unconstitutionality defense distinguishes citizens who simply choose not to
adhere to a known legal duty from those who act based on ignorance or a
misunderstanding of the law.'
The court ruled that a jury could be
instructed to "draw an inference that the defendant was aware of his legal
obligation from acts taken in protest to or to express a political view, even
though made with conviction and sincerity of purpose."' 29 Therefore, the
distinction between a good faith disagreement with the law, which is not a
defense, and a good faith misunderstanding or ignorance of the law, which is
a defense, is crucial to defendants in attempting to negate willfulness.
Despite the ostensible fact that no other -circuits had adopted its
objectively reasonable standard as to the ignorance or misunderstanding of the
law defense, the Seventh Circuit continued its application of this standard in

(1987) (upheld conviction of taxpayer who filed no returns on grounds wages were not
taxable; good faith disagreement with the tax laws not a defense; instruction on good
faith misunderstanding as defense is appropriate only if there is evidence from which
jury could reasonably find defendant misunderstood what law required of him); United
States v. Payne, 800 F.2d 227 (10th Cir. 1986) (belief tax laws violate constitutional
rights is not good faith misunderstanding); United States v. Mueller, 778 F.2d 539 (9th
Cir. 1985); United States v. Gleason, 726 F.2d 385 (8th Cir. 1984); United States v.
Kraeger, 711 F.2d 6 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Romero, 640 F.2d 1014 (9th Cir.
1981); United States v. Jones, 628 F.2d 402 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,450 U.S. 967
(1981) (good faith belief in unconstitutionality of Federal Reserve System did not
constitute legal defense to willful failure to file); United States v. Crowhurst, 629 F.2d
1297, 1298 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1021 (1980) (defendant's disagreement
with Internal Revenue Service's definition of "gross income" did not entitle him to
violate the law by failing to file proper return); United States v. Karsky, 610 F.2d 548
(8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1092 (1980) (good faith disagreement with the
law does not negate willfulness). See also supra note 37 and accompanying text.
126. United States v. House, 617 F. Supp. 232, 234 (W.D. Mich. 1985), aff'd by
order, 787 F.2d 593 (6th Cir. 1986) (quoting Burton, 737 F.2d at 442-43).
127. House, 617 F. Supp. at 234.
128. Id.
129. Id.
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United States v. Cheek 130 and was reversed by the United States Supreme
Court.' 3'

IV. INSTANT DECISION
The Court in Cheek began its discussion by recognizing the general rule
that ignorance or mistake of law is not a defense to a criminal prosecution. 132 The majority restated the common law presumption that every
person knows the law, while recognizing that the magnitude of statutes and
regulations have complicated attempts by taxpayers to comprehend their tax
duties under the law. 33 The Court noted that by requiring an element of
specific intent to violate the law for certain tax crimes, Congress has reduced
the effect of the common law presumption. 34 The Court mentioned that its
interpretation of "willfully" in Murdock created an exception to the traditional
rule for criminal tax offenses.' 35 The complexity of the tax laws is the
major reason for this special treatment. 36 In reference to its prior decisions
in Bishop and Pomponio, the Court stated that the standard for statutory
willfulness has been conclusively refined from "an act done with a bad
138
purpose" 37 to a "voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty."
Willfulness, as interpreted by prior decisions, requires the government to
prove that the defendant had a duty imposed by law, knowledge of that duty,
and a voluntary and intentional violation of that duty.1 39 The Court held
that the government satisfies the knowledge element of willfulness by proving
that knowledge of the relevant legal duty existed. 40 This burden, however,
also requires the government to negate a defendant's good faith claim of
ignorance or misunderstanding of the law.'
The reason for this burden,
postulated the Court, is that an individual cannot be cognizant that the law
imposes a duty upon him and still be unaware of it, misunderstand it, or

130. 882 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 1108 (1990),
vacated, 111 S. Ct. 604 (1991).
131. Cheek II, 111 S. Ct. at 604.
132. Id. at 609.

133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
136. Cheek II, 111 S. Ct. at 609.
137. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
138. Cheek I, 111 S. Ct. at 610. See supra notes 93-98 and accompanying text.
139. Cheek 1,111 S. Ct. at 610.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 610-11.
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believe that the duty is nonexistent. 142 The resulting issue was narrowly
stated as follows:
Whether, based on all the evidence, the Government has proved that the
defendant was aware of the duty at issue, which cannot be true if the jury
credits a good-faith misunderstanding and belief submission, whether
or not
143
the claimed belief or misunderstanding is objectively reasonable.
The Court, in applying this standard, explained that if Cheek declared
that he truly believed that the Code did not treat wages as income, and the
jury believed him, then the government did not meet its burden of proving
willfulness, regardless of the unreasonableness of the belief.144 The jury, in
assigning credibility to the defendant's good faith defense, can consider any
admissible evidence from any source revealing the defendant's awareness of
his duty. 14 Based on this explanation, the Court explicitly disagreed with
the Seventh Circuit's assertion that an alleged good-faith belief be objectively
reasonable to be considered by the jury as negating a defendant's awareness
of a legal duty.'
The Court explained that knowledge and belief are
customarily questions for the jury or factfinder. 147 If a particular belief is
characterized as not objectively reasonable, the analysis becomes a legal one,
thus precluding jury consideration.'" The Court felt that it was plausible
for a defendant to be unaware of his duty because of an irrational belief that
he did not have one. Therefore, any attempt to prevent jury consideration on
this issue could raise serious implications under the seventh amendment jury
trial provision. 149 Accordingly, the Court held that it was error to instruct
the jury to disregard Cheek's claim that he was not a person required to file
a return or pay taxes and that wages were not taxable income, regardless of
the ridiculous nature of these claims. 50

142. Id. at 611.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. This includes evidence showing the defendant's knowledge of relevant
Code sections or regulations, court decisions rejecting his interpretation of the law,
authoritative rulings of the Service, or any contents of the personal return forms and
accompanying instructions that made it clear that income included wages. Id.
146. Id.

147.
148.
149.
442 U.S.
150.

Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985); Sandstrom v. Montana,
510 (1979); Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952)).
Cheek 17, 111 S. Ct. at 611-12.
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The Supreme Court also held, however, that the trial court did not err in
instructing the jury to disregard Cheek's assertions that tax laws are unconstitutional.5 1 The Court regarded Cheek's position as "unsound," not because
it failed to be objectively reasonable, but because it lacked support from the
Murdock-Pomponio line of cases.5
That line of cases interpreted the
willfulness requirement of the Code's criminal provisions to mandate proof of
knowledge of the law.u 3 The Court then explained the reason for that
requirement:
[I]n our complex tax system, uncertainty often arises even among taxpayers
who earnestly wish to follow the law [and it] is not the purpose of the law
to penalize frank differences 5of
opinion or innocent errors made despite the
4
exercise of reasonable care.'

The Court felt, however, that claims that certain Code provisions are
unconstitutional require different treatment than claims of ignorance or

misunderstanding of the law.155 The Court asserted that claims of unconstitutionality do not arise from unintentional mistakes caused by the complexity
of the Code.' 56 Rather, these claims expose full awareness of the provisions

in dispute and a "studied conclusion,
however wrong, that those provisions are
1 57
invalid and unenforceable.

151. Id. at 612.
152. Id.
153. Id. See supra notes 83-98 and accompanying text.
154. Cheek I, 111 S. Ct. at 612 (quoting Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492,
496 (1943)).
155. Id. at 612.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 612-13. The court's view disregarding unconstitutionality as a defense
conforms with all the circuits that have ruled on the issue. These decisions reflect the
similar opinion that the claim reveals awareness of the law and a decision not to
adhere to it, which cannot rightfully negate the knowledge element of willfulness. See
supra notes 118-122 and accompanying text.
Justice Scalia, however, who joined only in the judgment of the Cheek decision,
insisted that, "[i]t is quite impossible to say that a statute which one believes
unconstitutional represents a, 'known legal duty."' Cheek II, 111 S. Ct. at 614.
Regarding the knowledge element of willfulness, Justice Scalia further commented that:
[O]ne may say, as we [Supreme Court] have said until today with respect
to the tax statutes, that 'willfully' refers to consciousness of both the act
and its illegality. But it seems to me impossible to say that the word refers
to consciousness that some legal text is binding, i.e., with the good-faith
belief that it is not a valid law.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss4/7
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In applying this view to the present case, the Court determined that
Cheek, after paying his taxes for years, attended various seminars and
conducted a personal study before concluding that tax laws could not
constitutionally impose a duty on him to pay taxes."" Therefore, the Court
believed that Congress did not contemplate that a taxpayer, like Cheek, could
ignore his legal duty and simultaneously refuse to utilize the available
statutory mechanisms without risking criminal prosecution.19 In reference
to these statutory mechanisms, the Court reasoned that Cheek was free to pay
taxes from year to year, file for a refund, and if denied, offer his claims of
unconstitutionality, invalid or otherwise, to the courts1 6° Therefore, the
Court decided that Cheek was in no position to claim that his good faith belief
regarding the invalidity of the Code provided a defense to willfulness under
sections 7201 and 7203.16' This decision was qualified by stating that
Cheek was, of course, free to present his claims and have them adjudicated at
the risk of being held wrong. 62
In conclusion, the Court held that the defendant's opinions regarding the
validity of tax statutes were irrelevant to the issue of willfulness, that they did
not require jury consideration, and that any instruction to disregard them
would be proper.1 63 Additionally, the outrageousness or substance of a
claim is not consequential.' 64 The jury, however, in deciding if the defendant acted willfully, should consider whether the defendant's assertions that
wages are not income or that he was not a taxpayer under the Code provisions
are objectively reasonable or not.' 65

158. Id.
159. Id. at 613.
160. Id. (citing I.R.C. § 7422 (1988)). The Court also mentioned that, "without
paying the tax, he [Cheek] could have challenged claims of tax deficiencies in the Tax

Court, 26 U.S.C. § 6213, with a right to appeal to a higher court if unsuccessful.
§ 7482(a)(1)." Cheek II, 111 S. Ct. at 613.
161. Cheek II, 111 S. Ct. at 613.
162. Id.

163. Id.
164. Id.

165. Id. In their dissenting opinion, Justices Blackmun and Marshall made the
observation that a commercial airline pilot is "presumably ...a person of at least
minimum intellectual competence." Id. at 615. They felt that the "objectively
reasonable" standard gave the defendant more, rather than less, protection because it
provided another obstacle for the prosecution to overcome. Id. They concluded by
commenting that "[T]his Court's opinion today.., will encourage taxpayers to cling
to frivolous views of the law in the hope of convincing a jury of their sincerity. If that
ensues... we have gone beyond the limits of common sense." Id.
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COMMENT

The Supreme Court's holding in Cheek v. United States is logical from
a purely legal viewpoint. As discussed previously, the Supreme Court requires
the element of knowledge of a legal duty in criminal tax offenses. 1 This
element does not require any lack of knowledge to be reasonable. The only
issue is whether or not those beliefs were in fact held by the defendant,
correctly or incorrectly, reasonably or unreasonably. 167 Additionally, the
Cheek decision certainly conforms with the decision of every circuit except
the Seventh Circuit.'( It is important to note that this holding does not
relieve taxpayers of their ultimate obligations to pay taxes, even though it does
give them a greater ability to escape criminal penalties.
Proponents of the subjective standard argue that even if the defendant's
alleged belief is outrageously unreasonable, it "should certainly influence the
jury's determination as to whether the belief is actually held" by the
taxpayer. 169 Therefore, proponents place their hopes on the fact that the
outrageousness of the belief will lead a jury to determine that there was no
possible way that the defendant could have held that belief in good faith.
Even if the jury is instructed to apply a subjective standard to determine
whether the defendant actually held this belief, however, there is no guarantee
that the jury will not place themselves in the defendant's shoes and find that
there is no way they would have acted similarly in his situation. Likewise,
there is no guarantee that a jury consisting of hardworking and taxpaying
citizens will not become so personally outraged by a defendant's frivolous
beliefs that they will convict the taxpayer under a "I pay so you should pay"
standard, regardless of the fact that the defendant might have actually held a
bona fide, albeit incorrect, belief. Especially during times of tax increases,
citizens who honestly and consistently pay their taxes are not likely to look
kindly upon non-taxpaying citizens asserting ridiculous beliefs that wages are
not income or that they are not a taxable person under the Internal Revenue
Code. In reality, it is possible that an objective standard will be applied
irrespective of the Court's instructions. This reality gives more credence to
the Seventh Circuit's objectively reasonable standard.
The views of the Seventh Circuit and the dissenters in Cheek attempt to
achieve a level of practicality beyond the mere defense itself. Their position
places even more emphasis on the voluntary compliance objective of the
federal tax system. The "objectively reasonable" standard mandates that
taxpaying participants have a rational and reasonably based misunderstanding

166.
167.
168.
169.

See supra note
See supra note
See supra note
See supra note

119
120
108
103

and
and
and
and

accompanying
accompanying
accompanying
accompanying

text.
text.
text.
text.
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of the tax law before a defense will be available to them. Thus, the
"objectively reasonable" standard encourages taxpayers to seek advice on
confusing and seemingly unascertainable tax laws rather than to just ignore
them because the criminal penalties could be severe if willful noncompliance
is found. If an objectively reasonable standard is not imposed, then the
prediction of the dissenters in Cheek could become a reality. The subjective
standard "will encourage taxpayers to cling to frivolous views of the law in
the hope of convincing a jury of their sincerity. '170 The tax court and other
federal district courts could become overrun with taxpayers asserting frivolous
beliefs that they are not subject to tax, hoping that a jury would find in their
favor. With court dockets clogged to capacity, the Supreme Court's holding
in Cheek invites even more disgruntled taxpayers to "have their day in court"
and assert any frivolous and outrageous proposition as their own, as long as
it involves a misunderstanding or ignorance of the law.
In addition to the effect on the court system, Cheek will have an impact
both inside and outside the area of tax practice. The decision certainly places
a greater burden on the Service in criminal tax cases. Not only must the
government prove that the defendant had knowledge of a legal duty, but it
must also negate any claim of ignorance or misunderstanding of the law that
the defendant raises. 17' As noted in one commentary: "By stressing the
prosecution's burden to prove that the defendant had the subjective intent to
violate the law, the Court reinforced the frequent claim by white-collar
172
defendants that they had no idea that their conduct violated the law."'
Therefore, a greater effort must Pe placed on analyzing the subjective
intent or state of the mind of the defendant. Because it is a state of mind,
willfulness can be proved only by the defendant's testimony or by circumstantial evidence of the particular surrounding facts, such as concealment of assets,
double bookkeeping, and other avoidance techniques.' 73 If circumstantial
evidence does not exist, however, a subjective state of mind provides an
almost insurmountable barrier to proving willfulness.
Outside the confines of tax practice, the Supreme Court's interpretation
of the willfulness requirement could be applied to other federal offenses that
contain a willfulness element. 74 In a review of the decision, one commentator observed that, "[t]he application of Cheek to other statutes may turn on
whether the offense involves a complex regulatory or statutory structure

170. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 140-141 and accompanying text.
172. Stewart, Supreme CourtReport: Springtimefor Criminals,77 A.B.A. J. 43

(March 1991).
173. See Note, supra note 82, at 1355.
174. Stewart, supra note 172, at 46.
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imposing duties that a defendant might well understand. 175 Currencyreporting requirements under the banking laws and complex submissions and.
certification requirements of federal contractors were statutes listed as
examples. 176 Therefore, the effect of Cheek will be felt by tax practitioners as
well as practitioners in other highly regulated and complex legal areas, where
a mere misunderstanding or ignorance of the law, no matter how unreasonable,
could prevent successful criminal prosecution. The Supreme Court's holding
in Cheek signifies a step backwards in achieving the voluntary compliance
objective of the federal tax system. Courts that hear tax cases will become
overrun with taxpayers asserting frivolous beliefs that they are not subject to
tax in an attempt to evade criminal penalties. Enforcers of the voluntary
compliance tax system must now face the added burden of trying to prove the
subjective intent of the defendant. This will encourage taxpayers to escape
criminal penalties by asserting outrageous "good faith" beliefs that negate the
willfulness element, and with greater ability to escape criminal penalties, they
may be more inclined to risk nonpayment of tax because civil penalties will
be the only certain result.
NICHOLAS A. MIRKAY III

175. Id.
176. Id.
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